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Abstract: This study addresses the changing strategies of social inclusion, which the 
Hungarian elites in Romania pursued after WWII. The establishment of communist rule in 
Romania involved the members of the Hungarian ethnic minority in very different ways. As early 
as 1946, inner tensions and debates occurred inside this community, while groups from its elite 
organized manifestations of resistance against the new rulers. After 1947, the communist 
leadership of Romania dramatically changed its policies with regard to the ethnic Hungarians, and 
this caused a great disillusion to those who believed that the collective rights of minorities would 
be guaranteed in the new political framework. The events of 1956 reshaped the way the cultural 
elites of that ethnic group related to the communist regime. Later, the manifest nationalistic 
propaganda of late communism in Romania generated political dissent among the members of a 
new generation of Hungarian intellectuals. It is in that period that the post-1989 political 
strategies of this community originate. When the cultural elite of the Hungarian minority had to 
assume the role of building a representative political structure in the transition to democracy, its 
representatives continued to a great extent to act like in late communism.  
Keywords: intellectuals; communism; minorities; social inclusion; political integration; 
cohabitation; collaboration; protest; intellectual resistance; samizdat; cultural identity; ethnicity; 
transition. 
 
 
At the end of WWII, the Hungarian intellectual elite from Transylvania, 
and its members with a background in humanities or social sciences in 
particular, redefined their mission of representing the community of the 
Hungarians living in Romania. This task was nonetheless to be carried out 
taking into account an ethnic concept of the Hungarian community and a social 
imperative: the very preservation of this community. Accordingly, the 
Hungarian community in Transylvania conceived itself in ethno-linguistic terms 
and as integral part of the larger Hungarian nation, which came to be divided 
due to the post-WWI geopolitical changes (Borsody 1988, 11-27). At the same 
time, the representatives of this community acknowledged the fact that their 
ethnic group was a minority in the newly established Romanian communist 
state, which they viewed as an institutional protector of a newly emerging 
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multi-ethnic political community. In this frame, the ethnic Hungarians were 
supposed to become a collective pillar of a political nation, defined in terms of 
citizenship. Such a view was consistent with the basic terms of the political 
alliance of 1945-46, which the Hungarian People’s Union and the communist-
dominated governmental coalition led by Petru Groza agreed upon. Later, the 
constitutional-administrative arrangement that led to the establishment of the 
Hungarian Autonomous Region in 1952 reinforced the idea of a multi-ethnic 
political community. The main goal of the Hungarian minority, its cultural 
reproduction, could have only been achieved through a network of educational 
institutions in the native tongue. These ideas regarding the preservation of the 
ethnic community actually reinforced the role of representation, which the 
intellectual elite of the Hungarians living in Romania assumed. This minority 
elite believed in, and argued for, cohabitation and cooperation with the 
representatives of the communist and presumably internationalist state. Their 
negotiation with the political establishment was carried out on grounds of 
collective rights and cultural reproduction. However, the response of these 
authorities was contrary to their expectations. In the late 1950s, the successive 
attempts at restricting or dismantling parts of the network of educational 
institutions in the Hungarian language illustrated that the increasingly 
Romanian-dominated communist regime changed its agenda. While carefully 
distancing itself from the Soviet Union, the Bucharest-based communist elite 
began building a new legitimizing narrative, which was based on Romanian 
ethno-nationalism. As this study illustrates, the Hungarian intellectual elite 
gradually turned to acts of resistance and then dissent against the ruling political 
regime. This author argues that the turn in the strategy of the Hungarian 
intellectual elite in Transylvania was inspired by the Hungarian Revolution of 
1956 and catalyzed by the wave of repression against those who sympathized 
with individuals and groups from the neighboring country. The anti-regime 
reaction of the Hungarians living in Romania gained momentum after 1959 and, 
as shown below, evolved gradually from Marxist-revisionism into an open 
criticism based on alternative values to communism, epitomized by the 
samizdat of the late 1970s and the 1980s.  
The establishment of the communist regime in Romania implied social 
and economic transformations, as well as restrictions, opportunities, 
persecutions, possibilities and limitations, which a centralized totalitarian state 
imposed upon the entire society, regardless of ethnic origin. At the same time, 
the same communist regime implemented gradually a set of political or 
administrative decisions, which referred to the ethnic Hungarians as a separate 
group, which in fact contradicted the official party narrative regarding the 
building a non-discriminatory society. The response of the Hungarian minority 
to the communist regime in Romania was defined mostly in ethnic terms, even 
by those who embraced leftist ideals, for this regime also acted and 
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conceptualized this community as a separate ethnicity. This type of mutual 
relation had an impact on the specific legislation which aimed at the integration 
of this community in communist Romania. On the one hand, these policies 
(which the Hungarians in the communist leadership first supported) sought in 
fact to dissolve any alternative source of solidarity among minority members, to 
the point of expecting assimilatory effects. On the other hand, these policies 
strengthened the commitment of several intellectual groups inside this ethnic 
community towards questioning the integrative strategy promoted by its 
representatives in the communist establishment and, on its turn, reinforced the 
ethnic frame of interpreting the relation with the ruling regime.  
The strategy which the elite of the Hungarian community pursued in 
order to represent the interests of that ethnic group in post-1945 Romania was 
influenced by a set of defining elements which were anchored in their previous 
experiences: (1) as a minority in Greater Romania; (2) as resulting from the 
competing Romanian and Hungarian nation-building processes; and (3) as 
derived from the direct involvement of some members of this community in the 
communist takeover in Romania. As well known, the Hungarians living in 
Romania settled mainly in the regions of Transylvania, the Banat and 
Szatmar/Bihar counties, which represented the easternmost and relatively 
underdeveloped regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, incorporated after 
WWI in the Romanian Kingdom, where they became its western and most 
developed parts. In particular, Transylvania, with its cities, towns and markets, 
with its industrial and communication infrastructures, and its population which 
was mainly rural, but driven by a market-oriented production of goods, 
represented a model of modernization, capitalistic mindset and bourgeois way 
of life for the rest of Romania. Rural Transylvania was dominated by the ethnic 
Romanians, while the Hungarian, German and Jewish communities remained 
prevalent in urban areas until the mid twentieth century.  
Governmental decrees banned the establishment of a Hungarian Union in 
Greater Romania. This form of organization was conceived as a representative 
body of all Hungarians living in this country, with economic, social and 
political functions, as well as prerogatives of representing the community not 
only in relation to the Romanian state, but also to relevant international 
institutions. In this view, the Hungarian community was defined as a state 
forming co-actor, as a contractual part of a plural Romanian constitutional 
community, which had its collective rights granted by the legal frames of the 
Wilsonian world order. The rejection of this project pushed the Hungarian 
community to frame its organization and representation after 1922 on the basis 
of a political party (Országos Magyar Párt – Hungarian National Party), while 
the traditional churches of the Hungarian community supported the education 
and implicitly the cultural reproduction of this group. The radical land reform 
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introduced after WWI in Romania, the constitutional and administrative frames 
of the new “unitary nation state,” the educational system which allowed only 
private schools subsidized by churches to organize instruction in the native 
language of the minorities created frustrations among Hungarians, who felt as 
under constant siege. For that reason, issues like the education the Hungarian 
language became sensitive and attracted ever since the constant attention of the 
elites of this community (Lönhárt 2008, 127-149; Mikó 1988, 19-26). 
Apart from these tensions, continuous controversies existed between the 
Romanian local and central elites. First, the policy of building a centralized state 
frustrated the local elites after 1920, when these found themselves deprived of any 
means of controlling the regional sources of wealth and implicitly of economic and 
social influence.1 After 1932, the local elites had definitely lost ground in front 
of the central elites and the increasingly authoritarian monarchy. The central elites 
were organized around the National Liberal Party, which managed to control the 
economic resources of the entire country through the administrative centralization 
and the financial institutions it established. The administrative and the electoral 
systems were part of its philosophy of building a body of strong central 
institutions capable of keeping under their unmitigated authority the different 
regions of the Romanian nation-state. From their point of view, ethnic diversity 
represented centrifugal forces working against Romanian sovereignty.2  
As for the competing Hungarian and Romanian nation-building processes 
and the associated international agreements, they had led already three times in 
the first half of the twentieth century to the change of interstate borders (in 
1920, 1940 and 1947). Moreover, these divergent processes separated the 
ethically different elite groups in Transylvania and thus the Romanians 
rethought their priorities and ended by having an agenda more and more 
opposed to that of the Hungarians. During WWII, the very possibility of losing 
the region to Hungary reshaped the political priorities of the Romanian 
Transylvanian elite and particularly those of the National Peasant Party, so 
much that it became a very committed political agent for restoring the 
Romanian nation state’s sovereignty over the entire region. This goal had not 
only the absolute support of the Romanian society, but also the underpinning of 
its interwar political rivals from the National Liberal Party. Thus, the Hungarian 
elite increasingly identified the Romanian elite in Transylvania with the conflicting 
                                                          
1
  Organized around the old cadres of the Romanian National Party, led by Iuliu Maniu, the 
Transylvanian Romanian elite represented the main opposition force in the interwar years. 
United in 1926 with the Peasant Party, they continued to demand a decentralized 
administration, pro-middle-class economic policies to favor the little entrepreneurs and 
economic development based on the agrarian profile of the country, while arguing in favor 
of Anglo-Saxon financial investments (Livezeanu 1998; Ornea 1969; Stan 1997; Stan 
1999). 
2
  For the role of the National Liberal Party led by Ion I. C. Brătianu and the ruling elites in 
interwar Romania, see Livezeanu (1998), Hitchins (1995) and Ornea (1980). 
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ethnic agenda, while the latter no longer considered the former a plausible political 
ally. Any political debate over the control of local resources or the 
administrative and political influence in the region was suspended after 1940. 
During this time span, the Hungarian community in Transylvania had to 
meet the challenge of being divided by the Second Vienna Award. Accordingly, 
the part of the community from Northern Transylvania went through the 
restoration of Hungarian authority, with all the opportunities and conflicting 
situations which resulted. For instance, the post-1920 generation of 
Transylvanian Hungarians, who affirmed their political beliefs in the late 1930s 
and the beginning of 1940s, was not embracing the conservative beliefs of 
either the Hungarian National Party in Romania or the Hungarian central 
government in Budapest. For them, the national-democratic, the agrarian-
socialist or even the Marxist forms of expressing their frustrations generated by 
the social and economic challenges of the 1930s were much more relevant. 
After 1940, the need of reforms in the once again eastern peripheries of the 
Hungarian Kingdom dominated their agenda.3 Marxism was embraced by some 
members of the Hungarian community even before 1940 because this 
represented a powerful idea which helped them challenge the authority of the 
Romanian Kingdom. Their vision was rooted in wishful thinking rather than 
empirical research, as the Soviet propaganda made them believe in the utopian 
project of egalitarian socialism and the community of peacefully coexisting 
nations.4 After 1945, these illusions dramatically changed when facing reality, 
but the agenda of these intellectuals changed only after 1949/1950. In 
comparison, the local Hungarian community in southern Transylvania was 
deprived in 1940-44 of all its political or economic influence,5 for the Second 
Vienna Awards did not leave them any means of negotiating with the central 
government. The government led by Marshal Ion Antonescu defined them once 
again as a source of internal destabilization and a danger to the nation-state, 
which had thus to be kept under surveillance and neutralized.  
Finally, the involvement of the representatives of the Hungarian 
community in the communist takeover in Romania represents a highly 
controversial issue in recent historiography. On the one hand, Hungary did not 
succeed in switching sides during the war, while immediately after the war the 
Soviets had less influence, for after the elections of October 1945 and until 
1947, its government was not led by the communists, but by the Smallholders’ 
                                                          
3
  For Northern Transylvanian political options, see Bárdi (2003, 134-137); Lakatos (2005, 
366-378); Vita (2014, passim). 
4
  For the Marxist beliefs of Hungarian ethnic minority representatives, see Vincze (1999, 263-
269); Lönhárt (2008, 140-147); Balogh (1978, passim); Demeter (1975, passim). 
5
  For Hungarians in Southern Transylvania in 1940-44, see Balogh (2013, passim); Kacsó 
(1993, 377-394); Csatári (1968, 143-144); Lönhárt (2008, 157-161). 
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Party. On the other hand, Romania’s geo-strategic position allowed a more 
direct Soviet involvement in politics from 1945 onwards. In this context, 
Northern Transylvania which was formerly under Hungarian administration was 
put under the Soviet Military Authority (Sălăgean 2002, Nagy 2001; Lönhárt 
2008, 166-179; Nagy & Vincze 2004). As a result, the autonomist discourse 
flourished, while the experience of strengthened regional institutions and 
networks redirected the Hungarian community’s collective agenda towards an 
administrative solution in terms of regional autonomy. At the same time, the 
question of Transylvania became a tool of political blackmail against Romania, 
which the Soviets used in order to enforce communist rule in this country 
(Sălăgean 2002; Ţârău 2005). 
All the above described experience of the interwar and war years 
reshaped the strategy of inclusion pursued by the local Hungarian elite. The 
proximity of the Hungarian state lost its importance after the Peace Treaties 
were signed in February 1947 and borders were once again resettled. Already 
the experience of 1944-45 made the representatives of the Hungarian 
community cease thinking in terms of returning to their mother country and 
start searching for solutions of integrating their ethnic group in communist 
Romania. Many counted on the political capital gained by supporting the 
communist-dominated Soviet-imposed government of Petru Groza in a key 
moment of late 1945, when this had to fight for legitimacy internally, as well as 
internationally, for it was rightfully contested as non-representative for the 
political spectrum in postwar Romania.  Then, some members of the Hungarian 
minority believed that a relation based on reciprocity could have been 
established between their ethnic community and the new central political power. 
The “loyal support” given by the Hungarian People’s Union (UPM) was indeed 
instrumental in the period of the communist takeover of 1945-47 (Lönhárt 2008, 
227-301). Some demands of the Hungarian community were thus met by the 
policies of the Groza government. Also, the official discourse on the Hungarian 
– Romanian relations was redefined: instead of the traditional rhetoric 
dominated by controversies over border and territorial issues, a new discourse 
of integrating the ethnic Hungarians emerged. This referred to new 
constitutional-legal frames, as well as political and administrative means, which 
were meant to guarantee adequate representation and equal status for that 
community in Romania and even envisaged the “spiritualizion of borders” in 
the Danube region. The new elites of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania 
identified with this discourse and thought its best strategy was cooperation with 
the communist-led government in order to enlarge the legislation that 
guaranteed the rights of their minority group. In 1945-47, this cooperation 
indeed helped them build an entire network of educational, cultural and 
economic institutions, place its representatives in locals and regional administrative 
bodies and change a significant part of the laws regarding minorities. 
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 However, the Romanians communists, once their political enemies were 
isolated or eliminated, began thinking of gaining national legitimacy by 
promoting the image of a Romanian Communist Party that had regained 
Transylvania back. Also, the communist-led government dissolved the local 
administrative structures built under the Soviet military control in Northern 
Transylvania and then isolated and stigmatized the autonomist group of left-
wing Hungarian social-democrats and communists, represented by Lajos 
Jordáky, István Lakatos, Géza Pásztai etc. (Nagy & Vincze 2004). Besides, 
other tensions arouse, such as those generated by the clarification of the 
citizenship of those individuals who fled before the war front passed and then 
returned, the establishment of the size of the Hungarian property sequestrated as 
enemy goods (CASBI) or the impact of the land reform law of March 1945. In 
addition, the still existing “interning camps,” where a part of the adult male 
Hungarian population was still detained, stirred anxiety and indignation. The 
Declaration offered by the leaders of the UPM, which sustained the unaltered 
Romanian sovereignty over Transylvania and reaffirmed its belief in solving all 
minority demands through the establishment of a “real democracy” under the 
communist-dominated government (17 November 1945), unleashed waves of 
protest in the first half of 1946. These culminated with the open demonstration 
of 30 June 1946 against the UPM and the communist-led government. This was 
in fact a counter-demonstration to the closing act of the UPM congress held in 
Odorheiu Secuiesc, where the members of the government had to assist to the 
destruction of all triumphant settings which their ally organization displayed in 
their honor (Lönhárt 2008, 323).  
In that particular moment, all the prerequisites for a real public debate on 
the strategy to be adopted for achieving the best representation of interests 
existed inside the Hungarian community. However, the alternative groups never 
came together, while official media obviously did not cover their views. These 
contesting groups were organized around the traditional cultural and economic 
organizations and leaders, such as Pál Szász, Ede Korparich, Ádam Teleki, 
Alajos Boga, Géza Nagy, or the traditional Hungarian churches, which 
contestated the UPM as the sole legitimate representative of this ethnic 
community. The activity of Áron Márton, the bishop of the Roman-Catholic 
Church is relevant for this matter. He criticized the new course of the Hungarian 
representative bodies as counterproductive, searched for allies in the traditional 
Romanian parties and opposed the new cultural and educational policies of the 
regime (Márton 1996, 139-151; Fülöp & Vincze 1998, 60; Lönhárt 2008, 318-
320). The contacts between the Hungarian opposition groups and the historical 
Romanian political parties, like the National Peasant Party or the National 
Liberal Party, remained sporadic though, while the negotiations for an 
agreement before the elections of 19 November 1946 unfinished (Lönhárt 2008, 
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318-319). Thus, the alternative groups failed to counterbalance the 
overwhelming influence of those leading figures allied with the communist-led 
government of Romania, which dealt with them from a dominant position.         
After the elections of 19 November 1946, which were in fact an electoral 
fraud that served the interests of the UPM as well, the communist leaders found 
themselves finally in the position to institutionalize total control over mass-
organizations. When the leaders of the UPM reiterated openly their demands in 
the National Assembly, counting on the promises made in the electoral period, 
any communication or possibility of negotiation was cut abruptly to their 
astonishment. Already in full control and with the borders confirmed after the 
signing of the Peace Treaty in Paris, the communist party leaders were no 
longer willing to promote the legislation promised to their “fellow travelers.” A 
new official narrative emerged, which insisted on the imperative of “sharpening 
the class struggle” and denounced the “reactionary” ideas of “national unity,” 
which allegedly undermined solidarity (Lönhárt 2008, 344-345). This change of 
discourse was followed by an open demand of restructuring the UPM in accordance 
with ideological premises which had to take into account that class struggle existed 
inside the ethnic Hungarian community as well. In fact, this meant the 
elimination of those leaders of the UPM who thought in the paradigm of representing 
the interests of the ethnic community, like Edgár Balogh, Lajos Jordáky, Gyárfás 
Kurkó. Isolated, then imprisoned and put on trial, these Hungarian communists 
were no longer mentioned publicly after 1949. Their case represents an 
illustration of the very fact that in a totalitarian regime alternative sources of 
political legitimacy, at collective or individual levels, could not exist.   
In addition, the Yugoslav-Soviet split and the Berlin crisis changed the 
international context and determined a modification of the domestic agenda of 
the communist regimes, which further engaged in strengthening control over the 
society in order to reassure the loyalty of different social and ethnic groups. 
Thus, the relation between the political center and specific group was 
reinterpreted. In 1949-55, not only the traditional elite, but also the members of 
the communist elite became victims of the repression. In several waves of 
arrests and trials, the leaders of the traditional Hungarian political, 
ecclesiastical, economic elite, as well as the leaders of the UPM or of the 
regional communist organizations who were of Hungarian background, came to 
be incriminated, isolated, imprisoned and even executed. The most important 
was the 1949 trial which involved the main representatives of the UPM, 
Hungarian social-democrats and even some communist regional leaders (like 
Lajos Jordáky, for instance), aside the Roman-Catholic Bishop of Transylvania 
Áron Márton. Shortly after, in 1953, the UMP was dissolved, and so the 
establishment of the one-party system was complete.  
When evaluating this evolution, one has also to keep in mind the nature 
of the Romanian political regime in the first half of the 1950s, which was in 
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essence a Stalinist totalitarian regime, heavily influenced in its administrative 
policy by the Soviet model. Thus, Romania was the only state in Eastern Europe 
which reevaluated the integration of national minorities in 1952 and introduced 
the Soviet administrative multi-level structure, including autonomous regions.6 
According to this logic, the Hungarian minority was redefined as the 
community of Hungarian-speaking workers, while the solution for their social 
inclusion was purely administrative. This 1952 “administrative solution” of 
integrating a multiethnic society in a socialist state was introduced at a time 
when Stalin personally showed interest in reading and editing the new 
Romanian constitution and the related administrative reform. As archival 
documents illustrate, the final decision was made at the highest possible level in 
Moscow, simultaneously with the modification of the Polish constitution 
(Bottoni 2007, 61-68). Accordingly, the Romanian Constitution of 24 
September 1952 stipulated the establishment of the Hungarian Autonomous 
Region. Thus, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej signed on 29 January 1953 a 
declaration which was released to the press, where he clearly stated that “the 
minority problem has been solved”. The complex formal and informal relations 
between the representatives of the Hungarian community and the central 
institutions of the regime were built from then onwards on a new basis. The 
entire ethnic community was integrated through the new administrative 
structures of the party-state, while any alternative source of collective 
identification and representation was de-legitimized. All activities were 
reframed on the basis of a new type of socialist solidarity, built around the 
exclusive legitimacy of the proletarian class, represented by the communist 
party and the new state built by it. Particularly interesting is how cultural and 
educational policies reformulated the old internationalist principles into the new 
slogan “national in forms, socialist in content.” 
The first years after the imperative imposition of the Stalinist model were 
marked by the illusion of a genuine administrative autonomy within the 
Hungarian Autonomous Region, entertained by the presence of some 
representative of the UPM in the local and regional bodies, as well as their 
prerogatives in building the legal frame for integrating the Hungarian 
                                                          
6
  The Hungarian Autonomous Region embodied mainly the Hungarian community of the 
Szeklerland (the eastern counties of Transylvania), which was almost exclusively 
inhabited by ethnic Hungarians. This region was overwhelmingly rural; the few small 
cities centers served as economic and administrative centers. This compact Hungarian 
presence was located in the geographic center of Romania. From that region to the 
Romanian-Hungarian borders, there were also other Hungarian communities, which were 
located mainly in urban centers of the Middle Transylvanian Plain and of the Szamos and 
the Maros Valleys opening to the Hungarian Great Plain. In these areas of Romania, Hungarians 
were still in relative majority in urban areas immediately after WWII, but they were surrounded 
by dominantly Romanian rural areas (Bottoni 2007, 61-88). 
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educational and cultural institutional network in the official state-subsidized 
system. This administrative change was perceived by the Hungarian minority in 
slightly different ways, but it certainly marked the ambivalent situation in which 
this community found itself in the mid 1950s. The Home Rule of the 
Autonomous Region, which according Article 21 had to be made by the 
Regional Popular Council and sanctioned by the Great National Assembly, was 
never ratified at central level, although a plan was devised in 1955. In addition, 
several administrative measures restrained the Hungarian institutional 
framework outside this area.7 These measures seemed to suggest that the 
legislative guarantees for the institutions of the Hungarian minority were 
restricted only the territory of the Autonomous Region, while the situation 
outside was uncertain and out of the control of the community. The city of Cluj, 
which represented the traditional center of the Hungarian political, economic 
and cultural institutional network, was not included in the Hungarian 
Autonomous Region. Thus, its position was challenged by new centers. 
Accordingly, Târgu Mureş emerged in the early 1950s as an alternative regional 
center, reinforced by the partial relocation of Hungarian cultural and 
educational institutions.  
New intellectual elites were recruited and promoted in the local press or 
cultural institutions, which were easily controlled by the central political 
structures. However, that generation of young intellectuals, which included 
András Sütő, Sándor Kányadi, László Földes, Sándor Huszár etc., embraced not 
only the socialist core of the official legitimizing narrative, but also the idea of 
collective rights and assumed the role of the intellectuals (of cultural elites) in 
“enlightening the people,” as well as the communitarian responsibility of 
“representing the many.” They regarded their role of representing their 
community as a vocation even. Yet, the popular slang enriched with a name for 
this category of representatives for the Hungarian minority who had to negotiate 
all issues at central institutional level in the capital city: “Bukarest járás” (Bányai 
2006, passim). This was a derogatory reference to the old medieval custom of 
resolving any issue in Istanbul, with the sultan and his court. Some of these 
                                                          
7
  The Hungarian Writers’ Union newspaper was relocated in Târgu Mureş in 1953 and the 
Theatre Art Institute in 1954. In Cluj, the Hungarian section of the Mechanical Institute 
was dissolved in the 1953/1954 academic year. The Agronomy Institute was not given 
new places for Hungarian students at the beginning of the 1955/1956 academic year, but 
only in the summer of 1956, after the representatives of the Hungarian community 
intervened at the highest level. On 15 July 1956, a resolution of the party and the state 
central organs appeared and stipulated the reframing of minorities’ education in mixed 
classes in all schools, high-schools and universities. These measures were accompanied 
by worrisome rumors of a possible relocation of the Hungarian Bolyai University from 
Cluj to Târgu Mureş, which proved wrong, for eventually the university was “united” with 
the Romanian Babeş University in the same city and not relocated, but it created serious 
concerns inside the community (Vincze 1999, 81-82). 
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representatives, who were really connected at central level became perceived rather 
as part of the nomenclature than of their ethnic community, for they seemed to act 
and think as such and thus were pejoratively compared with the “janicsárs.”8  
In 1956, the flow of information and cultural interchange between 
Romania and Hungary was almost inexistent as compared to previous years. To 
this situation, the elite of the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP) contributed to 
the greatest extent; tactical reasons determined them to keep the Hungarians in 
Romania apart from the influence of the reforms proposed by the Imre Nagy 
government. However, after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, a relaxation of the system could be observed. Above all, 
travel became easier, as passports were grated in higher number to university 
staff willing to visit Hungarian institutions, as well as to relatives wishing to 
resume family contacts. As the information became to flow in, the Hungarian 
minority and its intellectual elite were electrified. Thus, the Bolyai University, 
which was the veritable Hungarian intellectual nerve-center, gave reasons of 
concern to the communist party structures. In August 1956, Miron 
Constantinescu, at that time a member of the Politburo, had to meet the 
delegates of the Hungarian intellectuals and listen to their demands, which 
referred not only to the preservation of the network of educational institutions, 
but also to the reestablishment of the UMP as the legitimate body of political 
representation and to the issuance of a Status Law for Minorities (Benkő 2008). 
In this situation of potential instability, some positive measures meant to relax the 
tensions were taken. Among these were the reestablishment of a Hungarian section 
at the Agronomy Institute, the founding of a General Management Bureau for 
Nationalities inside the Ministry of Education and, beginning with 1957, of two 
periodicals in the Hungarian language: the traditional Marxist review Korunk 
and a new literary magazine for youth, named Napsugár (Vincze 1999, 82).  
However, the desire of change still mobilized the energies of the 
university youth and the young intellectuals. In October 1956, the opportunity 
of reframing the Organization of the Communist Youth at the beginning of the 
academic year generated new ideas of reform and institutional change that 
exceeded the limits allowed by the regime. The memorandum authored by the 
students of the Bolyai University asked not only for an independent students’ 
organization and the end of party control over it, but also for the rethinking of 
the institutional and ideological basis of education as part of a general reform, 
for the reestablishment of the autonomy of all universities, for the reintegration 
of the national Hungarian canon in the curricula, etc. The echoes of the 
revolution and fight for freedom against the Soviet intervention spread from the 
                                                          
8
  “Janicsár” (Yeniseri) – soldiers of the Turkish Empirial Army of Christian origin, who 
nonetheless fully identified with the imperial idea and thus were regarded as individuals 
who turned against their own ethnic group of origin. 
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Hungarians in Romania to the Romanian students, who also organized meetings 
and debated on memoranda in Timişoara, Iaşi, Craiova and Bucharest (Dávid et 
al. 2006, 23, Sitaru 2004, passim). In the All Saints’ Day of 1 November 1956, 
the lights of candles were seen by the observing eyes of the regime as signs of 
solidarity with those shot in the streets of Budapest (Dávid et al. 2006, 22-23). 
In this particular context, as documents show, some officers and soldiers of the 
Romanian People’s Army planned and even initiated an armed resistance 
against the regime (the Mărgineanu case in the Someş region).  
The Hungarian intellectuals, in particular those of Marxist convictions, 
believed that the limits imposed by the communist regime were to be 
trespassed. Regarding the struggle for reforms in Hungary, some believed to 
experience a historical moment, when their own reformist ideals, hampered 
hitherto by the dogmatism of the center, could have been fulfilled (Dávid et al. 
2006, 190). Others from the non-Marxist group of intellectuals or from the 
personalities connected to the traditional churches made plans for organizing a 
Christian Workers Party around a national agenda and for a possible armed 
uprising (the Szoboszlay group case).9 However, another part of the Hungarian 
intellectuals saw these events as endangering the institutional gains of the last 
decade, for the limits of the regime had been already transgressed. Thus, they 
formulated “declarations of loyalty” with the central political bodies in media. 
Individuals like János Fazekas, György Kovács and Pál Bugyi were 
instrumental in this respect (Vincze 1999, 83).  
At the same time, the communist regime in Bucharest reacted harshly to 
the events in Hungary and began repression against those who displayed their 
support for the insurgents and their reformist ideas in the neighboring country. 
Official discourses condemned the “counterrevolution” in Hungary, as well as 
the “nationalistic,” “right-wing,” “deviationist” opportunism of the 
revolutionaries, which was defined as a main threat to the building of a socialist 
society. The results of the subsequent wave of repression were more than 
34,000 people arrested, of whom only some 5,000 were officially put on trial, 
while the others imprisoned for long periods without at least a formal trial, 
some even executed (Dávid  et al. 2006; Pál-Antal 2006). The main Hungarian 
cultural institutions were suspected of “grave errors” and “nationalistic, 
reactionary attitudes.” Consequently, many professionals were ousted from the 
educational system. In fact, the ideological performance of the entire Hungarian 
educational system was questioned, for it failed to “grow the socialist 
internationalist spirit in national forms” (Vincze 1999). As well documented, 
the support offered by the RWP in restoring the communist regime in Hungary, 
as well as in capturing the members of the Nagy government and in keeping 
                                                          
9
   See A Belügyminisztérium összefoglaló jelentése a Szoboszlay-féle Keresztény Dolgozók 
Pártjáról Bukarest, 1958. [szeptember 1. után] (Bottoni 2006, 363-369). See also 
Péterszabó (2002, passim). 
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them under tight control in the Snagov area, was indeed essential (Baráth & 
Sipos 2006; Nagy 2004). This active involvement proved that there was a real 
interest among the Romanian communist leadership in restoring Soviet control 
over Hungary. At the same time, it reasserted the loyalty of the Romanian 
communists to the Soviet Union and the communist world movement. Thus, 
János Kádár thanked his Romanian colleagues by recognizing in 1958 that the 
case of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania was a closed issue. Not only the 
Hungarian nomenklatura was grateful, but also Khrushchev reconsidered the 
Romanian demand of withdrawing the Soviet Army from this country. 
Paradoxically, this “loyalty” proved by the Romanian regime to the cause of 
world communism in 1956 helped it later to distance itself from the Soviet 
Union, and to become a critic of its domination inside the Eastern Bloc.         
At the end of the 1950s and the beginning of 1960s, the Romanian 
communist regime changed its position towards the national question, as part of 
its plan to emancipate itself from the Soviet tutelage and rebuild its internal 
legitimacy on a new, national basis. Thus, the official discourse was enriched 
with elements from the national agenda to such an extent that it arrived at using 
with extreme efficiency the theme of nationalism. The new discourse, which 
made massive references to the conflicting national histories of the two 
countries, implicitly suggested that the Hungarian minority was generally 
distrusted by the communist central leadership because of the Transylvanian 
echoes of the Hungarian Revolution. In the midst of the new process of 
“building the Romanian socialist nation,” the elite of this community found 
itself totally marginalized. At the same time, the network of independent 
educational institutions was dissolved. The very symbol of this process, as 
registered in the Hungarian collective memory, was the unification of the Bolyai 
University with the Romanian Babeş University in 1959. This act provoked 
such a drama as suicides, which two professors, Zoltán Csendes and László 
Szabédi, committed in protest. Finally, the process of gradual dissolution of the 
Hungarian Autonomous Region beginning with the first half of the 1960s was 
seen as the last “assault” on the institutional residual basis of this minority 
(Vincze 1999, 84).  
In the meantime, the industrialization and urbanization efforts, as well as 
the accomplishment of collectivization and the implicit resettlement of the rural 
workforce to the emerging industrial centers, changed dramatically the profile 
of the urban communities. The migration of labor force to urban areas affected 
the ethnic balance of cities and towns in Transylvania. These processes were 
perceived by Hungarians not only in terms of social engineering or economic 
planning, but also as a collective trauma, for its elite had lost much of the 
political influence and the administrative positions, numerically as well as 
geographically: the Hungarian community was deprived of influence even in the 
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administrative, economic or political structures at regional and local levels. In 
addition, a major setback was registered in quantitative terms with regard to the 
education in the Hungarian language, and this was perceived as a danger to the 
institutional frame of cultural reproduction. For these reasons, the social 
engineering process had in the Hungarians’ collective memory an ethnic dimension. 
The legitimation through nationalism and the Stalinist cult of personality 
were already present in the mid 1960s. Yet, both reached a climax in 1968, 
when Ceauşescu became a national hero in view of many Romanians and a 
maverick ally in the Soviet Bloc (compared to Tito), due to his acts of defying 
the Soviet Union and strengthening Romania’s independence in foreign policy 
(by opening and maintaining ties with West Germany, Israel, communication 
channels to the Arab nationalistic governments, Vietnam and the Third World 
countries) (Deletant 1998, passim). Simultaneously, the administrative reform 
of 1968 led to the elimination of the Hungarian Autonomous Region, which had 
already lost its importance and relevance after the “reshaping” of 1961. Instead, 
the traditional county system was reintroduced, but the new county borders 
were drawn in such a way as to depose the whole pre-1965 administrative 
apparatus of its influence and grip in the policy making. This situation 
generated open demonstrations in the Hungarian inhabited region of the 
Szeklerland, but these actions were skillfully instrumented by Ceauşescu to get 
rid of old local nomenklatura and place his own trustworthy people (Sarány & 
Szabó 2001, 21-65). In one of his best known novels, writer András Sütő 
conveyed the spirit of the time through the image of his mother, whom he 
asked: “What shall I bring for you from Bucharest, mother?” as he had to go on 
duty there, and her answer was: “Fresh air” (Sütő 1970). This represents a 
testimony from the first decade of the Ceauşescu era, which in fact was 
misleading for a considerable time quite a number of prominent intellectuals, 
and not only from inside Romania.    
In reaction, the Hungarian cultural elite practiced the writing of secret 
protest memoranda and the “ius murmurandi.” Among those who reflected on 
the decline of the Hungarian network of cultural reproduction in Romania, there 
were two generations. The first included intellectuals socialized in Marxist 
debates since 1935, like Edgár Balogh, Lajos Takács, József Méliusz, while the 
second, post-1945 intellectuals, like, András Sütő, Pál Bodor, Géza Domokos, 
Károly Király. All were reunited under the sign of a new representative body 
(Magyar Nemzetiségű Dolgozók Országos Tanácsa - National Council of the 
Workers of Hungarian Nationality), which was organized by the communist 
state-party in 1968 and had its first meeting on 8 July 1969 (Vincze 1999, 88; 
Lipcsey 2008, 307). However, the role destined to this organization was to 
become clearer not much later, once Ceauşescu announced in 1971 that “the 
nation is not going to disappear from history, but to increase its role” (Vincze 
1999, 88). To this turn of the official discourse, the Hungarian community 
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reacted with a long row of demands for restoring the once achieved and then 
lost rights. These protests represented evidence, on the one hand, of the 
frustrations accumulated in time, and on the other, of the still existing illusion of 
establishing a dialogue with the “enlightened tyrant.”  
In 1972, Ceauşescu reinforced his earlier statements and declared that the 
building of the Romanian socialist nation was a priority: “the socialist nation 
was to be more homogenous than the bourgeois nation” (Vincze 1999, 91; 
Lipcsey 2008, 305- 311). At the same time, the Chinese and North Korean 
experiences were already influencing the Romanian communist leader in 
shaping a “min-cultural revolution” in this country. This change in cultural 
policy envisaged a fight against “cosmopolitan ideas” and “revisionism,” which 
was to be to be carried out in all areas. Accordingly, the Stalinist ideological 
vigilance was reintroduced in association with legitimizing nationalistic 
elements. In this new context, Ceauşescu’s reaction to a new memorandum of 
1974, which asked again during a plenary of the National Council of the 
Workers of Hungarian Nationality for the reestablishment of the previously 
existing rights of the Hungarian minority through the voice of Takács Lajos, 
was clear-cut: the real mission of the council was not the defense of the 
Hungarians’ rights, but the implementation of the socialist economic, social an 
cultural plans among the “Hungarian-speaking workers of Romania” (Vincze 
1999, 88-89). In those years, the Securitate made it also clear that all those who 
gave voices to open demands (the cases of Jenő Szikszay, Zoltán Zsuffa etc.) 
were put under close surveillance and isolated, even terrorized until some 
committed suicide (Vincze 1999, 89). 
The 1977 plenary of the National Council of the Workers of Hungarian 
Nationality was called only to ask the Hungarian representatives to openly 
distance themselves from the “revisionism, irredentism, Horthysm which 
endangers the integrity of the country” (Vincze 1999, 89; Lipcsey 2008, 316). 
Beginning with that year, the nationalistic propaganda of Romania’s Stalinist 
leaders, which implied the advancement to a different stage in the plan of social 
engineering known as “homogenization,” as well as the increasing international 
isolation of the Ceauşescu regime, contributed to the emergence of the 
phenomena of dissidence and samizdat. The memoranda authored by Lajos 
Takács and Károly Király were a part of a broader trend among the Hungarian 
left-wing Marxist intellectuals, who became increasingly estranged  from 
Ceauşescu’s version of Stalinist nationalistic totalitarianism (Vincze 1999, 92).  
In this conflicting domestic context, the Hungarian-Romanian debate at 
the level of the two neighboring communist states emerged to become quickly 
prominent due to the publicity made around some officially supported 
publications (Vincze 2009, 109-214). In the mid 1970s, the Hungarian 
Academy of Science formed a research group of historians, whose task was to 
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produce a ten volume compendium of Hungarian history. At the meeting of the 
CC of the RCP on 22 September 1975, Ceauşescu used an imperative tone to 
demand the Romanian historians to “respond to the attacks” of their Hungarian 
partners. The new “frontline” became the history of Transylvania. The 
participants used not only scientific publications (Történelmi Szemle, Századok, 
Magazin istoric), conferences (the Second International Congress of Thracology 
held in Bucharest in September 1978), but also ideological platforms (for 
instance, the periodical Era Socialistă). The meeting between János Kádár and 
Nicolae Ceauşescu, which was held in Debrecen and Oradea in June 1977, 
represented the last meeting of the two heads of party and state for a long time 
to come. The concluding document of this official meeting contained the idea 
that ethnic minorities represented “a bridge” between the two socialist nations, 
but the Romanian side insisted also on the idea that the questions related to 
ethnic minorities were part of the internal affairs of the two countries involved, 
emphasizing in this way the principle of non-interfering in the domestic policies 
of the neighboring state (Vincze 2009, 114-115; Földes 2007).  
The response to this mutual agreement came from Hungary unofficially. 
Drawing from Herder’s prediction about the disappearance of the Hungarian 
language and nation, the Budapest-based writer Gyula Illyés made references to 
the Hungarians living in Transylvania in an interview for a Paris-based 
periodical. This interview marked another crucial moment of the dispute: its 
internationalization (Illyés 1978). Several letters of protests authored by Zádor 
Tordai and Károly Király were then published in the West with the help of the 
organizations of the Hungarian immigrants in the USA (Vincze 2009, 158). 
Consequently, when Ceauşescu was paying his last official visit in the USA in 
the 1978, two such organizations, the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation and 
the World Union of the Hungarians, manifested in New York for the rights of 
the Romanian Hungarians. Obviously, this demonstration irritated to paroxysm 
the Romanian communist leader. The debate became then increasingly 
polemical with an article published by the Romanian writer Ion Spălăţelu on 4 
May 1978, in the periodical Contemporanul. This article introduced a new 
theme: Horthy’s fascism and the conflicting collective memories of the two 
communities in Transylvania, which was cut in two parts by the Second Vienna 
Award of 30 August 1940, held under the patronage of Germany and Italy. The 
accusation which pointed to the sufferings of the Romanians under Hungarian 
administration during WWII radicalized with Ion Lăncrănjan’s volume of 1982, 
entitled Cuvânt despre Transilvania (A word on Transylvania). The official 
Hungarian authorities considered this a direct attack against their country and 
the prestige of their own leaders, which the neighboring socialist country 
launched through this author who deliberately use an ultra nationalistic tone.  
The polemic stirred by this book estranged even more the representatives 
of the two communities, who could hardly maintain the dialogue from then 
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onwards. For instance, Balogh Edgár, an important Romanian Hungarian 
intellectual and opinion maker of true Marxist beliefs, was an adept of 
negotiated compromises with the Bucharest-based regime, for he believed in 
both the construction of the socialist society and the protection of the cultural 
rights of the ethnic community.  Although he still believed in the possibility of 
influencing the Romanian decision makers through direct contacts and dialogue, 
he became gradually marginalized in the public space, while his channels of 
communication could no longer be maintained.10 Increasingly isolated, he had 
the initiative of buying multiple copies of Lăncrănjan’s books in order to block 
its dissemination. This naïve maneuver represented an act of resistance, which 
was relevant for a personal way of thinking (Vincze 2009, 129). József Méliusz, 
another representative figure of the Hungarian elite with Marxist convictions 
and well-established liaisons inside the communist leadership, was put under 
the surveillance of the Securitate after Lăncrănjan accused him of irredentism. 
To this accusation he responded with an official letter of protest presented on 20 
April 1982 to Ceauşescu, in which he threatened the calumniator with a trial. 
Consequently, his open literary response to Lăncrănjan was denied publication 
(Vincze 2009, 132-133). An anti-Hungarian campaign seemed to be 
orchestrated by the Bucharest regime. Thus, Bucharest-based Hungarians like 
Géza Domokos and Sándor Huszár considered leaving the capital city in order 
to avoid possible consequences of this campaign. Even János Fazekas, then the 
vice-prime minister in the Romanian government, was affected after he 
protested against Lancrănjan’s accusations and demanded an official positioning 
against the ideas from this book. On 20 May 1982, during a meeting of the 
Political Executive Committee of the RCP, Constantin Dăscălescu and Iosif 
Banc asked for his retirement, while Ceauşescu supported them tacitly.11  
Many other representatives of the Hungarian community, such as Gyula 
Szabó, György Beke, János Gyöngyössy, Zsolt Gálfalvi, Ödön Bitay, Lajos 
Demény, Pál Bodor,  authored letters of protest, which they did not make 
public, but addressed directly to authorities. János Szász and Lajos Kántor even 
sent such letters to Dumitru Radu Popescu, the president of the Writers’ Union 
and a nomenklatura member in charge of propaganda. Ernő Gáll, the editor of 
Korunk in Cluj, warned the Romanian officials about the “tense situation 
created among Romanian and Hungrian intellectuals by the above mentioned 
book.” From among the memebers of the Romanian community, Marius 
                                                          
10
  Edgár Balogh tried also to persuade the Hungarian authorities through the Hungarian 
Consulate in Cluj to refrain from making any further steps that could lead to the escalation 
of the conflict (Vincze 2009, 157). 
11
  On the next day, Constantin Dăscălescu was nominated by Nicolae Ceauşescu as Ilie 
Verdeţ’s successor to the office of prime minister, in charge of forming a new government 
(Vincze 2009, 135). 
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Tabacu, professor of musicology, and Ioan Aluaş, a well-known professor of 
sociology at the Babeş-Bolyai University, also protested against Lăncrănjan’s 
type of narrative (Vincze 2009, 133-134). In May 1982, Géza Szőcs and Marius 
Tabacu wrote another letter, which ten intellectuals from Cluj co-signed; the 
latter registered it directly to the CC of the RCP headquarters. In Târgu Mureş, 
a similar collective letter was authored by writer András Sütő (who was also an 
alternative member of the CC of the RCP), then revised by György Gálfalvi and 
Béla Markó, and signed by 36 individuals, including Géza Domokos. This letter 
protested against the Lăncrănjan book on grounds that it was “against the line 
promoted by the party leadership on the question of nationalities” (Vincze 2009, 
136). Even that mild protest was denied support by some of the representatives 
of the Hungarian community who were part of the RCP establishment, such as 
Mihály Gere or Gyula Fejes, so it was taken to Bucharest by Domokos’s wife. 
In contrast to all those mentioned above, who addressed letters to the CC 
of the RCP because they still believed that the solution to the problems of the 
Hungarian community in Transylvania could have been solved only by the 
party, the younger generation no longer entertained this illusion. For instance, 
the Ellenpontok group lacked the strong Marxist convictions of the older group, 
so they tried through their samizdat to gain the attention of the West and to 
internationalize these problems, which they framed as a human rights issues. 
They believed that the solution for their ethnic minority was to be found in the 
model of liberal democracy and not in the Soviet-type of socialism. Thus, they 
addressed a memorandum to the CSCE meeting, which was held in Madrid in 
September 1982 (Vincze 2009, 158). The present study does not aim at 
analyzing in-depth the Hungarian-language samizdat in Romania; this is the 
topic of another on-going project. However, this study provides an overview of 
this phenomenon, presents the main groups of intellectuals who were involved 
in this enterprise and underlines how their pre-1989 civic activism was 
transformed into the post-1989 political commitment to build a new 
organization to represent the Hungarian community.  
Between 1977 and 1989, there were at least three well-known Hungarian 
anti-Ceauşescu samizdat series of publications and three corresponding groups 
of intellectuals. The Ellenpontok group organized itself around Attila Ara-
Kovács, Géza Szőcs, Sándor Molnár, Károly Antal Tóth, who managed to 
disseminate the alternative publication with the same name between 1981 and 
1983.12 The Limes circle was mostly active in Bucharest between 1985 and 
1989, while among the intellectuals connected to this circle were Gusztáv 
Molnár, Levente Salat, Gáspár Miklós Tamás, Károly Vekov et al.13 Finally, 
Kiáltó Szó was edited in Cluj in 1988, mainly by Sándor Balázs with the support 
                                                          
12
  For the documents of the samizdat Ellenpontok and memories revived by participants, see 
Tóth (2000). 
13
  On the Limes circle of debate and the samizdat edited by the participants, see Molnár (2004). 
REPRESENTING AN ETHNIC COMMUNITY IN A COMMUNIST STATE:  
TRANSYLVANIAN HUNGARIAN INTELLECTUALS  
BETWEEN COHABITATION AND RESISTANCE 
 
73
of György Nagy, Sándor Tóth, Árpád Páll, Róbert Schwartz and his wife Anikó, 
Zsolt Mester, András Visky, Zoltán Kiss, Levente Salat, Tamás Jakabffy, Ágnes 
and Sándor Farkas Bende, László Fábián, Marius Tabacu and László Tőkés.14 
In Romania, there were fewer manifestations against the regime than in 
any other country of the Soviet bloc. However, there were some workers’ 
revolts in 1977, in the Jiu Valley, and in 1987, in Braşov, while a short-lived 
independent trade union was established in 1978. Nevertheless, the Securitate 
acted always in such a way as to isolate the individual cases of protest and 
succeeded in keeping the intellectuals distant from the masses of frustrated 
working people. Thus, neither an organized opposition as that in Poland nor a 
network of intellectuals producing a samizdat-type of independent media 
existed. In short, there were isolated dissidents before 1989, but no structured 
movement able to challenge the communist establishment (Petrescu 2013). Paul 
Goma, Gheorghe Calciu Dumitreasa, Dorin Tudoran, Mircea Dinescu, Ana 
Blandiana, Doina Cornea etc. were well-known dissidents in Ceauşescu’s 
Romania, but they did not really have contacts with their Hungarian peers. In 
fact, the only cases of inter-ethnic collaboration in protest against Ceauşescu, 
which the Securitate files also illustrate, were those between Doina Cornea and 
Éva Gyimesi, to which one can add the support given by Marius Tabacu to 
Géza Szőcs and then to the editor of the samizdat Kialtó Szó, Sándor Balázs.15 
The first two groups of samizdat-editing intellectuals had been strongly 
influenced by the reformist socialist ideals of a Marxist thinker from Cluj, 
György Bretter, around whom a circle including students in philosophy and 
social sciences functioned in the late 1970s. Ernő Gáll had also a certain impact 
on their intellectual formation. Thus, the members of these groups adopted 
critical Marxism and revisionist thinking, but they also had certain liberal 
beliefs. It was from a leftist platform that Ceauşescu’s Stalinist yet nationalist 
practices were challenged in the conditions in which the non-Marxist domestic 
opposition was weak. While the winds of change were already blowing in the 
rest of the Soviet bloc, those who advocated the reformation of the system from 
within hoped for a change of party leadership at the Fourteenth Party Congress 
in November 1989. Although the internationalist, reformed communist and pro-
Soviet Ion Iliescu was not promoted to the leading position then, the revolution 
brought him to the fore on 22 December 1989. In this context, the first option of 
the Hungarian intellectuals who founded RMDSZ/UDMR (Democratic Alliance 
of the Hungarians in Romania – DAHR) was to ally with the Iliescu-led 
National Salvation Front (NSF). In order to understand such an option, one has 
                                                          
14
  For the samizdat publication named Kiáltó Szó, see Balázs (2005). 
15
  Doina Cornea and Eva Gyimesi were named by the Securitate agents keeping them under 
surveillance Coca and Cola. What an example of Securitate’s selection of names given to 
the enemy! See also Lipcsey (2008, 333). 
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to take into account that the program of the DAHR and even its symbolism 
recalled the political legacy of the UPM in 1944-47 (Kántor 2013; Fodor 2013).  
Established in the purpose of advocating the reformation of the state in 
order to meet the requirements of a multicultural society, the DAHR included 
left-wing intellectuals of Marxist or liberal beliefs, such as Géza Domokos, Béla 
Markó, Éva Gyimesi, Edgár Balogh etc. The break with the NSF came only in 
the spring of 1990, after the street conflicts in Târgu Mureş. Then, the cultural 
demands of the Hungarian community advocated by the DAHR led to a massive 
manipulation of the Romanian public opinion against what seemed to be an 
escalation of violence. After the elections of May 1990, violence was used 
again; this time, alleged miners savagely beat the protesters against the political 
dominance of Iliescu’s NSF in Bucharest. In these conditions, the Hungarian 
cultural elites opted for joining the democratic opposition to the so-called neo-
communist Iliescu regime. In reaction, the latter became increasingly 
nationalistic, especially after 1992, when NSF had to rely on the support of 
political organizations such as the right-wing Greater Romania Party and the 
Party of the Romanians’ National Unity or the Socialist Party of Labor, which 
was nostalgic for Ceauşescu’s era. 
The opposition sustained by the DAHR proposed a single candidate for 
presidency and thus managed to win both the parliamentary and the presidential 
elections of 1996.16 This political option of the DAHR had no ideological roots, 
for it was not anchored in any affiliation with the ideas specific to the political 
right. In this authors’ view, it was the result of contingency. In the post-
communist Romanian context, the DAHR sought for an agreement with those 
political forces willing to support the interests of the Hungarian community, as 
defined by the DAHR.17 At the same time, the analysis above suggests that the 
political options and beliefs of those who emerged after 1989 as leaders of the 
Hungarian community were shaped by their pre-1989 dissidence and 
involvement in the samizdat phenomena. Due to these activities, they adopted a 
combination of human-rights centered, liberal and Marxist revisionist ideas. 
Their experience under communism was unique. On the one hand, their 
perception of reality was in obvious conflict with the dogmatic vision of the 
Bucharest-based communist party leadership. On the other hand, it differed 
from that of the Romanian dissidents, who were neither Marxists nor interested 
in the issue of collective rights. Thus, they could hardly find a common 
                                                          
16
  The opposition which gained control over political power after November 1996 united 
under the umbrella of the Democratic Convention two main traditional parties of 
Romania, the National Peasant Party and the National Liberal Party, aside the Social-
Democratic Union, which consisted of the historical Social Democratic Party of Romania 
(PSDR) and the post-communist Democratic Party (PD) led by the former Prime Minister 
Petre Roman, and finally the DAHR (Pavel & Huiu 2003, 226-230 and 244-284). 
17
  One can observe the same kind of logic in the DAHR’s political support to the post-2000 
political left and then to the post-2004 political right governments. 
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platform of protest. These multiple narratives reflect different perceptions of the 
social, economic and political issues. When reconstructing the communist past, 
one should consider this diversity. 
To conclude, the strategy of the politically active Hungarian intellectuals 
in Transylvania in the post-communist period originates in their particular 
experience of Romanian communism. In contrast with the interwar elite, which 
hoped for the revision the borders that separated this minority in Romania from 
the Hungarian state, the postwar representatives of the Hungarian community in 
Transylvania opted for the institutionalization of collective rights and 
integration. Their main goal was to build the premises of successful dialogue 
and negotiation with the Bucharest-based authorities in order to achieve social 
and political integration under the communist and presumably internationalist 
regime. When confronted with the increasing nationalism of this type of 
communist regime, the elite of the Hungarian community reacted by radically 
reformulating its strategy of achieving the main goal. Since the dialogue failed, 
the only option was resistance against the policies of the Romanian state, which 
were perceived as a direct threat to the cultural reproduction of this minority. 
Thus, some representatives of the Hungarians in Transylvania engaged in acts 
of open dissent against the communist regime in the 1970s and increasingly in 
the 1980s. It was from their dissidence that the post-communist political 
organization of this community emerged to become the main advocate of 
minority rights during the transition to democracy. 
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